encompasses many economic models with externalities and outside options. We show that when outside options are pure (i … distribution of coalitional gains and the dynamics of coalition formation are characterized in four illustrative applications. …

This paper extends the theory of endogenous coalition formation, with complete information and transferable utility, to …

We consider a standard coalitional bargaining game where once a coalition forms it exits as in Okada (2011), however … chosen with equal probability. If that is the case, she can choose any coalition she belongs to. However, a coalition can …

the efficient coalition structure is stable in terms of the coalition formation theory. It is assumed that coalitions can … coalitions) and a coalition may deviate if and only if it stands to gain from it. It is then shown that subsequent to a deviation … by a coalition, the nonmembers will have incentives to break apart into singletons, as is assumed in the definition of …

We adopt the largest consistent set defined by Chwe [J. of Econ. Theory 63 (1994), 299-235] to predict which coalition …, based on the assumption that players are cautious. For games with positive spillovers, many coalition structures may belong … to the largest consistent set. The grand coalition, which is the efficient coalition structure, always belongs to the …

show the equivalence between the set of pairwise stable matchings and the set of matchings generated by coalition …

polluting firms have - under mild conditions - an incentive to join a coalition whose members mutually truthfully exchange …

externalities. An organization is defined as a group of agents, together with a set of bilateral relations, formally, a connected … graph. Because of the presence of externalities, the profitability of coalitional threats to an organization depend on the … externalities, while the fully connected organization emerges under negative. This result is shown to hold independently of the …