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Ettinger, David - 2003

We consider an auction setting in which potential buyers, even if they fail to obtain the good, care about the price paid by the winner. We study the impact of these price-externalities on the first-price auction and the second-price auction in a symmetric information framework. First, we...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011591224

All-Pay auctions with negative prize externalities : theory and experimental evidence

Sacco, Dario; Schmutzler, Armin - 2008

The paper characterizes the mixed-strategy equilibria in all-pay auctions with endogenous prizes that depend positively on own effort and negatively on the effort of competitors. Such auctions arise naturally in the context of investment games, lobbying games, and promotion tournaments. We also...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003892457

Core-stable rings in second price auctions with common values

Forges, Françoise; Orzach, Ram - 2010

In a common value auction in which the information partitions of the bidders are connected, all rings are core … form, in spite of the underlying strategic externalities. A ring is core-stable if the core of this characteristic function … compatible mechanism. -- Auctions ; Bayesian game ; Collusion ; Core ; Partition form game ; Characteristic function …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008737094

Auctioning monopoly franchises : award criteria and service launch requirements

Moretto, Michele; Dosi, Cesare - 2009

We study the competition to acquire the exclusive right to operate an infrastructure service, by comparing two different specifications for the financial proposals - "lowest price to consumers" vs "highest concession fee", and two alternative contractual arrangements: a contract which imposes...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008810289

Optimal mechanisms for an auction mediator

Matros, Alexander; Zapechelnyuk, Andriy - 2010

We consider a dynamic auction environment with a long-lived seller and short-lived buyers mediated by a third party. A mediator has incomplete information about traders' values and selects an auction mechanism to maximize her expected revenue. We characterize mediator-optimal mechanisms and show...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008659956

Auctioning vs. grandfathering in cap-and-trade systems with market power and incomplete information

Alvarez González, Francisco; Jarque Andrés, Francisco - 2013

We compare auctioning and grandfathering as allocation mechanisms of emission permits when there is a secondary market with market power and the firms have private information. Based on real-life cases such as the EU ETS, we consider a multi-unit, multi-bid uniform auction, modelled as a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010226080

Bidding for conservation contracts

Di Corato, Luca; Dosi, Cesare; Moretto, Michele - 2014

Contracts providing payments for not developing natural areas, or for removing cropland from production, generally require long-term commitments. Landowners, however, can decide to prematurely terminate the contract when the opportunity cost of complying with conservation requirements increases....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010380650

Auction mechanisms and bidder collusion : bribes, signals and selection

Llorente-Saguer, Aniol; Zultan, Ro’i - 2014 - This version: November 20, 2014

The theoretical literature on collusion in auctions suggests that the first-price mechanism can deter the formation of bidding rings. In equilibrium, collusive negotiations are either successful or are avoided altogether, hence such analysis neglects the effects of failed collusion attempts. In...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010472820

The chopstick auction : a study of the exposure problem in multi-unit auctions

Onderstal, Sander; Englmaier, Florian; Guillén, Pablo; … - 2004

Multi-unit auctions are sometimes plagued by the so-called exposure problem. In this paper, we analyze a simple game called the chopstick auction' in which bidders are confronted with the exposure problem. We analyze the chopstick auction with incomplete information both in theory and in a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599133

Nonparametric identification and estimation of multi-unit, sequential, oral, ascending-price auctions with asymmetric bidders

Paarsch, Harry J.; Brendstrup, Bjarne - 2004

Within the independent private-values paradigm, we derive the data-generating process of the winning bid for the last unit sold at multi-unit sequential English auctions when bidder valuations are draws from different distributions; i.e., in the presence of asymmetries. When the identity of the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599182

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