Usually, groups increase their productivity by the specialization of their group members. In these cases, group output is no longer simply a sum of individual outputs. We analyze contests with group-specific public goods that allow for different degrees of complementarity between group...

Contests between groups are plagued by intra-group externalities (freeriding).Yet, costless incentive schemes that entirely avoid free-riding within a group might not be desirable, neither individually nor socially. In contests among two groups, a relatively weak (i.e., small or unproductive)...

The modern state has monopolized the legitimate use of force. This concept is twofold. First, the state is empowered with enforcement rights; second, the rights of the individuals are (partly) restricted. In a simple model of property rights with appropriation and defense activity, we show that...

The present paper analyzes the occurrence of the group-size paradox in situations in which groups compete for rents, allowing for degrees of rivalness of the rent among group members. We provide two intuitive criteria which for groups with homogenous valuations of the rent determine whether...