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Strategic risk in contract design
Sadrieh, Abdolkarim; Voigt, Guido - 2013
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009726270
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Performance pricing and covenants in debt contracts in the UK
Chatterjee, Robin A. (contributor) - 2006
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003324860
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Optimal contract orders and relationship-specific investments in vertical organizations
Parlane, Sarah; Ying Yi Tsai - 2013
This paper characterizes the optimal contracts issued to suppliers when delivery is subject to disruptions and when they can invest to reduce such a risk. When investment is contractible dual sourcing is generally optimal because it reduces the risk of disruption. The manufacturer (buyer) either...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010188418
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Organizing competition for the market
Iossa, Elisabetta; Rey, Patrick; Waterson, Michael - 2019
The paper studies competition for the market in a setting where incumbents (and, to a lesser extent, neighboring incumbents) benefit from a cost advantage. The paper first compares the outcome of staggered and synchronous tenders, before drawing the implications for market design. We find that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012414922
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Optimal contracts for renewable electricity
Parlane, Sarah; Ryan, Lisa - 2019
Companies are increasingly choosing to procure their power from renewable energy sources, with their own set of potential challenges. In this paper we focus on contracts to procure electricity from renewable sources that are inherently unreliable (such as wind and solar). We determine the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012063073
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Supply chain coordination by contracts under binomial production yield
Clemens, Josephine; Inderfurth, Karl - 2014
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010491906
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In the long-run we are all dead : on the benefits of peer punishment in rich environments
Engelmann, Dirk; Nikiforakis, Nikos - 2012
We investigate whether peer punishment is an efficient mechanism for enforcing cooperation in an experiment with a long … time horizon. Previous evidence suggests that the costs of peer punishment can be outweighed by the benefits of higher … cooperation, if (i ) there is a sufficiently long time horizon and (ii ) punishment cannot be avenged. However, in most instances …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011489806
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In search of workers' real effort reciprocity : a field and a laboratory experiment
Hennig-Schmidt, Heike; Rockenbach, Bettina; Sadrieh, … - 2005
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003049204
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Caps on political contributions, monetary penalties and politician preferences
Pastine, Ivan; Pastine, Tuvana - 2009
With politician preferences over policy outcomes, the effect of a contribution cap with monetary penalties for exceeding the cap is starkly different from the case with an indifferent politician. In contrast to Kaplan and Wettstein (AER, 2006) and Gale and Che (AER, 2006), a cap is never neutral...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009725000
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When and how the punishment must fit the crime
Mailath, George J.; Nocke, Volker; White, Lucy - 2015
In repeated normal-form (simultaneous-move) games, simple penal codes (Abreu,1986, 1988) permit an elegant characterization of the set of subgame-perfect outcomes. We show that the logic of simple penal codes fails in repeated extensive-form games. By means of examples, we identify two types of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011491781