We study the effects of monetary shocks in a model of state-dependent price and wage adjustment based on "control costs". Suppliers of retail goods and of labor are both monopolistic competitors that face idiosyncratic productivity shocks and nominal rigidities. Stickiness arises because precise...

We use microdata to estimate the strength of price selection - a key metric for the effect of monetary policy on the real economy. We propose a product-level proxy for mispricing and assess whether products with larger mispricing respond with a higher probability to identified monetary and...

We document three new empirical facts: (i) monetary policy shocks increase the markup dispersion across firms, (ii) they increase the relative markup of firms with stickier prices, and (iii) firms with stickier prices have higher markups. This is consis- tent with a New Keynesian model in which...

In this paper we analyse the ability of time and state dependent price setting rules to explain durations of price spells or the probability of changing prices. Our results suggest that simple time dependent models cannot be seen as providing a reasonable approximation to the data and that state...

We study optimal pricing rules for a public large-value payment system (LVPS) that produces a public good (like prevention of systemic risk) but faces competition by a private LVPS for the private provision of large value payments. We show that the marginal cost of the public LVPS has to be...

This paper reports the results of an ad hoc survey on price-setting behaviour conducted in February 2004 among 2,000 Belgian firms. The reported results clearly deviate from a situation of perfect competition and show that firms have some market power. Pricing-to-market is applied by a majority...

In this paper we explore the link between the intensity of product market competition and inflation rates across EU countries and sectors. We consider long-term averages of inflation rates in order to remove the cyclical behavior of inflation over time and as alternative proxies of competition...