In this paper, we construct a structural model to determine the costs of a bank rescue considering bail-outs and bail-ins. In our model, a government assumes the equity stake under unlimited liability upon abandonment of the original equity holders. The model determines an abandonment trigger...

In this study, we reassess the links between commercial bank ownership and lending growth during the 1996-2019 period. We find evidence that the lending activities of foreign state-controlled and foreign privately owned banks differ, particularly during different crisis type periods and origins....

I propose a dynamic general equilibrium model in which strategic interactions between banks and depositors may lead to endogenous bank fragility and slow recovery from crises. When banks' investment decisions are not contractible, depositors form expectations about bank risk-taking and demand a...

This paper uses granular data on syndicated loans to analyse the impact of international reforms for Global Systemically Important Banks (G-SIBs) on bank lending behaviour. Using a difference-in-differences estimation strategy, we find no effect of the reforms on overall credit supply, while at...

This paper illustrates that systemically important banks reduce a range of activities at year- end, leading to lower additional capital requirements in the form of G-SIB buffers. The effects are stronger for banks with higher incentives to reduce the indicators, and for banks with balance sheet...

We develop a dynamic structural model of bank behaviour that provides a microeconomic foundation for bank capital and liquidity structures and analyses the effects of changes in regulatory capital and liquidity requirements as well as their interaction. Our findings suggest that adjustments in...

We present a quantitative model of deposit insurance. We characterize the policymaker's optimal choices of coverage for depositors and premiums raised from banks. Premiums contribute to a deposit insurance fund that lowers taxpayers' resolution cost of bank failures. We find that riskadjusted...