I propose a dynamic general equilibrium model in which strategic interactions between banks and depositors may lead to endogenous bank fragility and slow recovery from crises. When banks' investment decisions are not contractible, depositors form expectations about bank risk-taking and demand a...

This paper analyzes the private production of safe assets and its implications for financial stability. Financial intermediaries (FIs) originate loans, exert hidden effort to improve loan quality, and create safe assets by issuing debt backed by the safe payments from (i) their own loans and...

Banks are intrinsically fragile because of their role as liquidity providers. This results in under-provision of liquidity. We analyze the e¤ect of government guarantees on the interconnection between banks' liquidity creation and likelihood of runs in a model of global games, where banks.and...

This paper uses data on bilateral foreign exposures of domestic banking systems in order to construct early warning models for financial crises that take into account cross-country spill-overs of vulnerabilities. The empirical results show that incorporating cross-country financial linkages can...

This paper studies the interaction of government debt and financial markets. This interaction, termed a "diabolic loop", is driven by government choice to bail out banks and the resulting incentives for banks to hold government debt rather than self-insure through equity buffers. We highlight...