This paper quantifies the deterioration of achievable stabilization outcomes when monetary policy operates under imperfect credibility and weak anchoring of long-term expectations. Within a medium-scale DSGE model, we introduce through a simple signal extraction problem, an imperfect knowledge...

Media coverage of monetary policy actions is a central channel of a central bank's communication with the wider public, and thus an important factor for its credibility and policy effectiveness. This paper analyses the coverage which ECB monetary policy decisions receive in the print media, and...

Transparency has become an almost universal virtue among central banks. The paper tests empirically, for the case of the Federal Reserve, two hypotheses about central bank transparency derived from the debate of Morris and Shin (2002) and Svensson (2006). First, the paper finds that the...

A crucial but often ignored element of inflation expectations is the amount of perceived inflation risk. This paper estimates the degree of uncertainty and asymmetry in the probability forecasts of the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF) using a new methodology. The main conclusion from our...

Using intra-day data, we assess the impact of the press release on euro area monetary data on the different segments of the euro area yield curve. For this purpose, we estimate a relation between the newsʺ or surpriseʺ in the released data for annual M3 growth and the move in the interest...

We study credible information transmission by a benevolent Central Bank. We consider two possibilities: direct revelation through an announcement, versus indirect information transmission through monetary policy. These two ways of transmitting information have very different consequences. Since...

This paper first shows that the forecast error incurred when assuming that future inflation will be equal to the inflation target announced by the central bank is typically at least as small and often smaller than forecast errors of model-based and published inflation forecasts. It then shows...

This paper shows that the credibility gain from permanently committing to a fixed exchange rate by joining the European Monetary Union can outweigh the loss from giving up independent monetary policy. When the central bank enjoys only limited credibility a pegged exchange rate regime yields a...