We present a quantitative model of deposit insurance. We characterize the policymaker's optimal choices of coverage for depositors and premiums raised from banks. Premiums contribute to a deposit insurance fund that lowers taxpayers' resolution cost of bank failures. We find that riskadjusted...

We build a balance sheet-based model to capture run risk, i.e., a reduced potential to raise capital from liquidity buffers under stress, driven by depositor scrutiny and further fuelled by fire sales in response to withdrawals. The setup is inspired by the Silicon Valley Bank (SVB) meltdown in...

Banks are intrinsically fragile because of their role as liquidity providers. This results in under-provision of liquidity. We analyze the e¤ect of government guarantees on the interconnection between banks' liquidity creation and likelihood of runs in a model of global games, where banks.and...

Rapid and large deposit outflows from banks have regained attention in the context of the March 2023 demises of Credit Suisse, SVB and other regional US banks. Moreover, the possible introduction of CBDC or a marked success of stablecoins are perceived as additional clouds over the future of...

This paper tests financial contagion due to interbank linkages. For identification we exploit an idiosyncratic, sudden shock caused by a large-bank failure in conjunction with detailed data on interbank exposures. First, we find robust evidence that higher interbank exposure to the failed bank...

Does the level of deposits matter for bank fragility and efficiency? In a banking model with endogenous bank runs and a consumption-saving decision, we show that the level of deposits has opposite effects on bank fragility depending on the nature of bank runs. In an economy with panic-driven...

The results of this paper provide empirical evidence that regulatory capital ratios drive bank Credit Default Swaps (CDS) and that markets react more to changes in capital requirements if implemented via direct adjustments to Pillar 1 risk weights than imposed as a percentage of Risk-Weighted...

We study the relationship between banks' size and risk-taking in the context of supranational banking supervision. Consistently with theoretical work on banking unions and in contrast to analyses emphasising incentives under- pinned by the too-big-to-fail effect, we find an inverse relationship...

The paper evaluates the impact of a phased-in introduction of capital requirements on equity, risk-taking, and probability of default for a sample of European systemically important banks. Contrary to the case of a one-off introduction of capital requirements, this study does not find evidence...