Showing 1 - 10 of 25
We study a version of the Colonel Blotto game where valuations across battlefields are heterogeneous and asymmetric. These games can exhibit unique pure strategy equilibria, some of which are non-monotonic with respect to the battlefield valuations. We test our theoretical predictions in the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011407610
We study the impact of loss-aversion and the threat of catastrophic damages, which we jointly call threshold concerns …, on international environmental agreements. We aim to understand whether a threshold for dangerous climate change is as an …), or low damages (gain domain). Under symmetry, that is when countries display identical degrees of threshold concern, we …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011457579
This article provides a non-technical overview of important results of the game theoretical literature on the formation and stability of international environmental agreements (IEAs) on transboundary pollution control. It starts out by sketching features of first and second best solutions to the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011600452
Standard non-cooperative game theoretical models of international environmental agreements (IEAs) draw a pessimistic picture of the prospective of successful cooperation: only small coalitions are stable that achieve only little. However, there also exist IEAs with higher participation and more...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011602768
We empirically test stability of climate change coalitions with the STAbility of Coalitions model (STACO). The model comprises twelve world regions and captures important dynamic aspects of the climate change problem. We apply the stability concept of internal and external stability to a cartel...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011591872
This paper compares stability of international environmental agreements for six different rules of coalition formation under very general conditions (any type of heterogeneity between countries). The rules can be interpreted as different institutional settings in which treaty formations take...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011591895
We analyze with an integrated assessment model of climate change the formation of interna-tional environmental agreements (IEAs) by applying the widely used concept of inter-nal & external stability and several modifications of it. We relax the assumptions of a single agreement and open...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011592755
We model a bipartite network in which links connect agents with public goods. Agents play a voluntary contribution game in which they decide how much to contribute to each public good they are connected to. We show that the problem of finding a Nash equilibrium can be posed as a non-linear...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011283197
This paper investigates the interplay of trade and terrorism externalities under free trade between a developed nation that exports a manufactured good to and imports a primary product from a developing nation. A terrorist organization targets both nations and reduces its attacks in response to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011691593
We formulate and study a general finite-horizon bargaining game with simultaneous moves and a disagreement outcome that need not be the worst possible result for the agents. Conditions are identified under which the game is dominance solvable in the sense that iterative deletion of weakly...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003827923