Showing 1 - 10 of 28
This paper uses variation in the timing of the Mexican antipoverty program's introduction across municipalities to identify its impact on the share of votes for the local incumbent party. Evidence is found that voters reward the mayor's party for the central benefit to their constituencies,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011289331
We study the impact of loss-aversion and the threat of catastrophic damages, which we jointly call threshold concerns …, on international environmental agreements. We aim to understand whether a threshold for dangerous climate change is as an …), or low damages (gain domain). Under symmetry, that is when countries display identical degrees of threshold concern, we …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011457579
We formulate and study a general finite-horizon bargaining game with simultaneous moves and a disagreement outcome that need not be the worst possible result for the agents. Conditions are identified under which the game is dominance solvable in the sense that iterative deletion of weakly...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003827923
This paper examines international cooperation on technological development as an alternative to international cooperation on GHG emission reductions. It is assumed that when countries cooperate they coordinate their investments so as to minimize the agreement costs of controlling emissions and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010344228
This paper studies the incentives for international cooperation if (some) countries prefer a more equitable distribution of per capita emission levels. The impact of such an equity preference is analyzed first for a bilateral, and then for a multilateral environmental problem. We show that -...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011598232
This article provides a non-technical overview of important results of the game theoretical literature on the formation and stability of international environmental agreements (IEAs) on transboundary pollution control. It starts out by sketching features of first and second best solutions to the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011600452
Standard non-cooperative game theoretical models of international environmental agreements (IEAs) draw a pessimistic picture of the prospective of successful cooperation: only small coalitions are stable that achieve only little. However, there also exist IEAs with higher participation and more...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011602768
We empirically test stability of climate change coalitions with the STAbility of Coalitions model (STACO). The model comprises twelve world regions and captures important dynamic aspects of the climate change problem. We apply the stability concept of internal and external stability to a cartel...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011591872
This paper compares stability of international environmental agreements for six different rules of coalition formation under very general conditions (any type of heterogeneity between countries). The rules can be interpreted as different institutional settings in which treaty formations take...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011591895
We analyze with an integrated assessment model of climate change the formation of interna-tional environmental agreements (IEAs) by applying the widely used concept of inter-nal & external stability and several modifications of it. We relax the assumptions of a single agreement and open...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011592755