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A decentralized market with common values uncertainty : non-steady states

Blouin, Max; Serrano, Roberto - 1998

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011504686

The nucleolus, the kernel, and the bargaining set: an update

Iñarra García, Elena; Serrano, Roberto; Shimomura, … - 2019

nucleolus. This paper is an update on the nucleolus and its two related supersolutions, i.e., the kernel and the bargaining set. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012018578

Small informational size and interim cores of large quasilinear economies

Kamishiro, Yusuke; Serrano, Roberto - 2018

We provide nonemptiness results of approximate interim cores with endogenous communication in large quasilinear economies, where every agent's informational size is small. We offer results for both replica and more general sequences of economies.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011890497

Level-k mechanism design

De Clippel, Geoffroy; Saran, Rene; Serrano, Roberto - 2016 - This version: July 2016

Models of choice where agents see others as less sophisticated than themselves have significantly different, sometimes more accurate, predictions in games than does Nash equilibrium. When it comes to mechanism design, however, they turn out to have surprisingly similar implications. This paper...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011515723

Information and small group effectiveness in large quasilinear economies

Kamishiro, Yusuke; Serrano, Roberto; Wooders, Myrna Holtz - 2015 - This version: October 2015

satisfying incentive compatibility. When the number of agents with private information remains finite, the main argument relies … on an adaptation of the small group effectiveness condition, previously proposed for games of complete information. The …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011405139

Bargaining, coalitions and externalities : a comment on Maskin

De Clippel, Geoffroy (contributor); … - 2008

bargaining among any group of agents results in an efficient distribution of the surplus they can produce. We also provide some …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003809530

Rationalizable implementation of correspondences

Kunimoto, Takashi; Serrano, Roberto - 2016 - This version: May 2016

We come close to characterizing the class of social choice correspondences that are implementable in rationalizable strategies. We identify a new condition, which we call set-monotonicity, and show that it is necessary and almost sufficient for rationalizable implementation. Set-monotonicity is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011483605

Multiplicity of mixed equilibria in mechanisms : a unified approach to exact and approximate implementation

Serrano, Roberto; Vohra, Rajiv - 2009

; approximate implementation ; incomplete information ; incentive compatibility ; monotonicity …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003897853

Equilibrium blocking in large quasilinear economies

Kamishiro, Yusuke; Serrano, Roberto - 2009

We study information transmission in large interim quasilinear economies using the theory of the core. We concentrate … on the core with respect to equilibrium blocking, a core notion in which information is transmitted endogenously within … which asymmetric information remains as an externality and non-market outcomes stay in the core, as well as those for the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003897856

Evaluating the conditions for robust mechanism design

Kunimoto, Takashi; Serrano, Roberto - 2010

We assess the strength of the different conditions identified in the literature of robust mechanism design. We focus on three conditions: ex post incentive compatibility, robust monotonicity, and robust measurability. Ex post incentive compatibility has been shown to be necessary for any concept...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008669301