Prior research examining consumer expectations of equity and price fairness has not addressed wage fairness, as measured by a firm’s pay ratio. Pending legislation will require American public companies to disclose the pay ratio of CEO wage to the average employee’s wage. Our six studies...

We link the corporate governance literature in financial economics to the agency cost perspective of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) to derive theoretical predictions about the relationship between corporate governance and the existence of executive compensation incentives for CSR. We test...

We explore the relationship between managerial incentives and environmental harm. We find that high-powered executive compensation packages can increase the odds of environmental law-breaking by 40-60% and the magnitude of environmental harm by over 100%. We document similar results for the...

Effective design of executive compensation contracts involves choosing and weighting performance measures, as well as defining the mix between fixed and incentive-based pay components, with a view to fostering talent retention and goal congruence. The variability in compensation design observed...

We examine the influence of proxy advisors on firms’ shareholder engagement behavior. Our analyses exploit a quasi-natural experiment using Say-On-Pay voting outcomes near a threshold that triggers a review of engagement activities by Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS). Firms receiving...

Almost all CEO and executive bonus plans have serious design flaws that limit their benefits dramatically. Such poorly designed executive bonus plans destroy value by providing incentives to manipulate the timing of earnings, mislead the board about organizational capabilities, take on excessive...