We study how the introduction of a central bank digital currency (CBDC) would affect the stability of the banking system. We present a model that captures a concern commonly raised in policy discussions: the option to hold CBDC can increase the incentive for depositors to run on weak banks. Our...

Are financial intermediaries inherently unstable? If so, why? What does this suggest about government intervention? To address these issues we analyze whether model economies with financial intermediation are particularly prone to multiple, cyclic, or stochastic equilibria. Four formalizations...

We study the implications of liquidity regulations and monetary policy on depositmaking and risk-taking. Banks give risky loans by creating deposits that firms use to pay suppliers. Firms and banks can take more or less risk. In equilibrium, higher liquidity requirements always lower risk at the...

Blockchain technology breathes new life into the classical analysis of money as a substitute for a ledger of all past transactions. While it involves updating the ledger through a decentralized consensus on the unique truth, the robustness of the equilibrium that supports this consensus depends...

Truthful reporting about the realization of a publicly observed event cannot be guaranteed by a consensus process. This fact, which we establish theoretically and verify empirically, holds true even if some individuals are compelled to tell the truth, regardless of economic incentives. We...

We present a model of secured credit chains in which assets generated from intermediation activity and pledged as collateral create fragility. A dealer stands between a borrower and a financier. The dealer borrows from the financier to fund her project, subject to a moral hazard problem, In...