Similar Search Results

Monetary and social incentives in multi-tasking : the ranking substitution effect

Stefan, Matthias; Huber, Jürgen; Kirchler, Michael; … - 2020

Rankings are prevalent information and incentive tools in labor markets with strong competition for talent. In a dynamic model of multi-tasking and an accompanying experiment with financial professionals, we identify hidden ranking costs when performance in one task is incentivized and ranked...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012220112

Don't hate the player, hate the game : uncovering the foundations of cheating in contests

Dutcher, E. Glenn; Glätzle-Rützler, Daniela; Ryvkin, … - 2016

Contests are meant to attract the best performers and incentivize high effort, however, they may also attract cheaters who try to win via illicit means which crowds out the best performers. We use a laboratory experiment to explore the role of self-selection in contests with a possibility of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011548973

Optimal contracts based on subjective evaluations and reciprocity

Sebald, Alexander; Walzl, Markus - 2012

As we have demonstrated in a recent laboratory experiment [see Sebald and Walzl (2012)], individuals tend to sanction others who subjectively evaluate their performance whenever this assessment falls short of the individual's self-evaluation even if their earnings are unaffected by the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009742622

Subjective performance evaluations and reciprocity in principal-agent relations

Sebald, Alexander; Walzl, Markus - 2012

We conduct a laboratory experiment with agents working on and principals benefitting from a real effort task in which the agents' performance can only be evaluated subjectively. Principals give subjective performance feedback to agents and agents have an opportunity to sanction principals. In...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009742627

Subjective performance evaluations and reciprocity in principal-agent relations

Sebald, Alexander; Walzl, Markus - 2012

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009724356

Optimal contracts based on subjective evaluations and reciprocity

Sebald, Alexander; Walzl, Markus - 2012

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009724209

Incentives for dishonesty : an experimental study with internal auditors

Balafoutas, Loukas; Czermak, Simon; Eulerich, Marc; … - 2017 - This version: 20 April 2017

the nature of provided incentives. We conduct a 'lab in the field' experiment with internal auditors during two large … performance of the unit that they are auditing. We vary incentives in the experiment from individual (piece rate) to competitive … that incentive-based compensation increases dishonest behavior among internal auditors: competitive incentives lead to …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011639592

Rankings and risk-taking in the finance industry

Kirchler, Michael; Lindner, Florian; Weitzel, Utz - 2016

Rankings are a pervasive feature of the finance industry. Although they have no direct monetary consequences, rankings provide utility for intrinsic (positive self-image) and extrinsic (status) reasons. We recruit a unique subject pool of 204 financial professionals and investigate how anonymous...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011417442

How social preferences shape incentives in (experimental) markets for credence goods

Kerschbamer, Rudolf; Sutter, Matthias; Dulleck, Uwe - 2015 - This Version: February 2015

Credence goods markets suffer from inefficiencies caused by superior information of sellers about the surplus-maximizing quality. While standard theory predicts that equal mark-up prices solve the credence goods problem if customers can verify the quality received, experimental evidence...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010479932

Second-Degree Moral Hazard in a Real-World Credence Goods Market

Balafoutas, Loukas; Kerschbamer, Rudolf; Sutter, Matthias - 2013 - This version: 16 October 2013

Empirical literature on moral hazard focuses exclusively on the direct impact of asymmetric information on market outcomes, thus ignoring possible repercussions. We present a field experiment in which we consider a phenomenon that we call second-degree moral hazard - the tendency of the supply...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010193289