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Individuals and teams in UMTS-license auctions
Sutter, Matthias; Kocher, Martin; Strauß, Sabine - 2007 - This version: 15 October 2007
more likely to win the auction when teams bid. -- UMTS auction ; team decision-making ; experiment ; winner's curse …We examine bidding behaviour of individuals and teams in an experimental auction resembling UMTS-license auctions. Even … relied on individual bidders. Our results show that teams stay on average longer in an (ascending sealed-bid English) auction …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009731143
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Individuals and teams in UMTS-license auctions
Sutter, Matthias; Kocher, Martin; Strauß, Sabine - 2007
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003675359
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Public procurement and supplier job creation : insights from auctions
Srhoj, Stjepan; Dragojević, Melko - 2021 - This draft October 5, 2021
Public procurement contracts (PPCs) of goods, services and works is about one tenth of global gross domestic product. Much research has been conducted on government spending and its aggregate effects, but evidence is scarce at the micro-level. This study exploits sealed-bid PPC auctions of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012650218
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Vickrey auction vs BDM : difference in bidding behaviour and the impact of other-regarding motives
Flynn, Niall; Kah, Christopher; Kerschbamer, Rudolf - 2015
In an experiment we first elicit the distributional preferences of subjects and then let them bid for a lottery, either … in a Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (BDM) mechanism or a Vickrey auction (VA). Standard theory predicts that altruistic subjects …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011404058
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Competing trade mechanisms and monotone mechanism choice
Feess, Eberhard; Grund, Christian; Walzl, Markus; … - 2014 - This version: November 3, 2014
We analyze mechanism choices of competing sellers with private valuations and show the existence of monotone pure strategy equilibria where sellers with higher reservation value choose mechanisms with a lower selling probability and a larger revenue in case of trade. As an application we...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010428738
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The optimal allocation of prizes in tournaments of heterogeneous agents
Balafoutas, Loukas; Dutcher, E. Glenn; Lindner, Florian; … - 2012
Tournaments are widely used in organizations, explicitly or implicitly, to reward the best-performing employees, e.g., through promotion or bonuses, and to punish the worst-performing employees, e.g., through firing or unfavorable job assignments. We use a principal-agent model to compare the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009742082
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Competing trade mechanisms and monotone mechanism choice
Feess, Eberhard; Grund, Christian; Walzl, Markus; … - 2015 - This version: December 19, 2014
We analyze mechanism choices of competing sellers with private valuations and show the existence of monotone pure strategy equilibria where sellers with higher reservation value choose mechanisms with a lower selling probability and a larger revenue in case of trade. As an application we...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010470913
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Don't hate the player, hate the game : uncovering the foundations of cheating in contests
Dutcher, E. Glenn; Glätzle-Rützler, Daniela; Ryvkin, … - 2016
who try to win via illicit means which crowds out the best performers. We use a laboratory experiment to explore the role …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011548973
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No need for more time : intertemporal allocation decisions under time pressure
Lindner, Florian; Rose, Julia - 2016
Time preferences drive decisions in many economic situations, such as investment contexts or salary negotiations. These situations are characterized by a very short time frame for decision making. Preferences are potentially susceptible to the confounding effects of time pressure, as proposed by...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011523286
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The limits of guilt
Balafoutas, Loukas; Fornwagner, Helena - 2016 - This version: 25 April 2016
According to the theory of guilt aversion, agents suffer a psychological cost whenever they fall short of other people's expectations. In this paper we suggest that there may be limits to this kind of motivation. We present evidence from an experimental dictator game showing that dictators...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011455212