This paper discusses the incentive conflicts that arise in banking supervision in the EU in a principal-agent framework, where the regulator is the agent and the taxpayers is the principal. The regulatory agent in addition to maintaining financial stability (the objective of the principal) may...

This paper discusses the incentive conflicts that arise in banking supervision in the EU in a principal-agent framework, where the regulator is the agent and the taxpayers is the principal. The regulatory agent in addition to maintaining financial stability (the objective of the principal) may...

The internet revolution is said to foster integration of the market for financial services, since consumers are able to shop around at all companies worldwide and firms can easily offer their services on the internet at a minimum of distribution cost. However, the European market for online...

The internet revolution is said to foster integration of the market for financial services, since consumers are able to shop around at all companies worldwide and firms can easily offer their services on the internet at a minimum of distribution cost. However, the European market for online...

Financial markets in Europe become more and more integrated. The persisting fragmentation of financial supervision, however, constitutes a lasting obstacle to integration. The aim of this paper is to assess these costs of supervisory fragmentation. We find clear evidence for the existence of...

The system of banking supervision in Europe is undergoing substantial reforms. According to Stigler?s capture theory regulation often follows the preferences of producers. Therefore, the interests of the financial industry might be a major driving force for the ongoing supervisory reform debate....

The systemic risk potential in the European banking market has increased. Hence, the following questions emerge: Is there a need for a truly European supervisory framework? And, how should a potential European supervisor be organised? This paper evaluates the existing supervisory framework as...

The systemic risk potential in the European banking market has increased. Hence, the following questions emerge: Is there a need for a truly European supervisory framework? And, how should a potential European supervisor be organised? This paper evaluates the existing supervisory framework as...

The system of banking supervision in Europe is undergoing substantial reforms. According to Stigler?s capture theory regulation often follows the preferences of producers. Therefore, the interests of the financial industry might be a major driving force for the ongoing supervisory reform debate....

Financial markets in Europe become more and more integrated. The persisting fragmentation of financial supervision, however, constitutes a lasting obstacle to integration. The aim of this paper is to assess these costs of supervisory fragmentation. We find clear evidence for the existence of...