This paper discusses the incentive conflicts that arise in banking supervision in the EU in a principal-agent framework, where the regulator is the agent and the taxpayers is the principal. The regulatory agent in addition to maintaining financial stability (the objective of the principal) may...

Start-up firms often face difficulties in raising external funds. Employing a unique panel dataset covering 9,715 start-up firms over the period 2007-2009, we find that high-tech startups are less likely to use bank finance and face more difficulties in raising bank finance than low-tech...

Die Abgrenzung des Erfolges multinationaler Unternehmungen (MNU) für körper-schaftsteuerliche Zwecke erfolgt im Regelfall im Rahmen des Fremdvergleichsgrundsatzes, konkretisiert durch die Transferpreisrichtlinien der OECD. Dieses Erfolgsabgrenzungsparadigma steht im systematischen Gegensatz zu...

In recent years, some European countries have relied on elements of an allow-ance for corporate equity (ACE) in the design of their tax systems. We analyse the effects of ACE-based taxation on rates of return and effective tax rates. In-vestment neutrality is lost if the imputed interest rate...

Economic agents who face the diversity of tax systems demand condensed but sophisticated information on effective tax burdens. We analyse common features and differences between important forward-looking concepts of measuring effective tax rates in business management and economics and develop...

Current political discussions in Germany and other European countries illustrate the importance accorded to revenue and distribution effects of tax reforms. Whereas widely recognized concepts of effective tax measures can provide important insights into the incentives of taxation they do not...

Current political discussions in Germany and other European countries illustrate the importance accorded to revenue and distribution effects of tax reforms. Whereas widely recognized concepts of effective tax measures can provide important insights into the incentives of taxation they do not...

Venture capital markets are characterized by multiple incentive problems and asymmetric information in an uncertain environment. All kinds of agency problems are present: moral hazard, adverse selection, hold-up problems, window dressing, etc. Entrepreneurs and venture capitalists enter into...

We analyze the venture capitalist's decision on the timing of the IPO, the offer price and the fraction of shares he sells in the course of the IPO. A venture capitalist may decide to take a company public or to liquidate it after one or two financing periods. A longer venture capitalist's...

This paper examines how capital is determined by German banks. We analyse whether the determinants found in the previous empirical literature hold for the special German banking sector with its three characteristic banking groups of savings banks, cooperative banks and other banks. On the basis...