This paper discusses a capacity-based redispatch mechanism in which awarded market participants are compensated for their availability for redispatch, rather than activation. The rationale is to develop a market design that prevents so-called 'inc-dec gaming' when including flexible consumers...

Auctions with endogenous rationing have been introduced to stimulate competition. Such (procurement) auctions reduce the volume put out to tender when competition is low. This paper finds a strong negative effect of endogenous rationing on participation when bid-preparation is costly,...

This paper proposes a game-theoretic model to analyze the strategic behavior of inc-dec gaming in market-based congestion management (redispatch). We extend existing models by considering incomplete information about competitors' costs and a finite set of providers. We find that these extensions...

The targeted design of auctions has to take behavioral regularities into account. This paper explores whether procurement auction formats can take advantage of bidders' willingness-to-pay-willingness-to-accept disparity. In a laboratory experiment, we compare four different second-price auction...

The focus of the paper is on the individual decision of energy consumers, and it's relation to sustainable consumption. Consumer behavior is based on individual decisions, but it depends largely on supply-side measures and an appropriate infrastructure (e.g. the availability of energy-efficient...

The focus of the paper is on the individual decision of energy consumers, and it's relation to sustainable consumption. Consumer behavior is based on individual decisions, but it depends largely on supply-side measures and an appropriate infrastructure (e.g. the availability of energy-efficient...