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The choice of institutions to solve cooperation problems: A survey of experimental research
Dannenberg, Astrid; Gallier, Carlo - 2019
in prisoners' dilemmas, public goods games, and common pool resource games. Participants in these experiments have the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012011030
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Voting in international environmental agreements: Experimental evidence from the lab
Dannenberg, Astrid - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW) - 2010
different voting schemes to determine the terms of the agreement. To this end, unanimity, qualified majority voting, and simple … majority voting are compared with respect to the resulting pollution abatement level and social welfare. At first sight in line … with theoretical predictions, the experiment shows that the change of the voting scheme implemented in an IEA does not …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008694111
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On the formation of coalitions to provide public goods: Experimental evidence from the lab
Dannenberg, Astrid; Lange, Andreas; Sturm, Bodo - 2010
The provision of public goods often relies on voluntary contributions and cooperation. While most of the experimental literature focuses on individual contributions, many real-world problems involve the formation of institutions among subgroups (coalitions) of players. International agreements...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010300513
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On the formation of coalitions to provide public goods: Experimental evidence from the lab
Dannenberg, Astrid; Lange, Andreas; Sturm, Bodo - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW) - 2010
The provision of public goods often relies on voluntary contributions and cooperation. While most of the experimental literature focuses on individual contributions, many real-world problems involve the formation of institutions among subgroups (coalitions) of players. International agreements...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008568601
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Inequity Aversion and Individual Behavior in Public Good Games: An Experimental Investigation
Dannenberg, Astrid; Riechmann, Thomas; Sturm, Bodo; … - 2007
We present a simple two-steps procedure for a within-subject test of the inequity aversion model of Fehr and Schmidt (1999). In the first step, subjects played modified ultimatum and dictator games and were classified according to their preferences. In the second step, subjects with specific...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010297914
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Inequity Aversion and Individual Behavior in Public Good Games: An Experimental Investigation
Sturm, Bodo; Riechmann, Thomas; Dannenberg, Astrid; … - 2007
We present a simple two-steps procedure for a within-subject test of the inequity aversion model of Fehr and Schmidt (1999). In the first step, subjects played modified ultimatum and dictator games and were classified according to their preferences. In the second step, subjects with specific...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010297936
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Do Equity Preferences Matter in Climate Negotiations? An Experimental Investigation
Dannenberg, Astrid; Sturm, Bodo; Vogt, Carsten - 2007
This paper investigates in how far equity preferences may matter for climate negotiations. For this purposes we conducted a simple experiment with people who have been involved in international climate policy. The experiment, which was run via the Internet, consisted of two simple non-strategic...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010297962
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The ratchet effect in social dilemmas
Gallier, Carlo; Sturm, Bodo - 2020
In this paper, we investigate whether dynamic incentive schemes lead to a ratchet effect in a social dilemma. We test whether subjects strategically restrict their contribution levels at the beginning of a cumulative public goods game in order to avoid high obligations in the future and how this...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012196432
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Voting for burden sharing rules in public goods games
Gallier, Carlo; Kesternich, Martin; Sturm, Bodo - 2014
In this experiment, we endogenize the choice of which contribution scheme is implemented in a public goods game. We investigate three rule-based contribution schemes. In a first step, players agree on a common group provision level using the principle of the smallest common denominator....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010398712
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The impact of burden sharing rules on the voluntary provision of public goods
Kesternich, Martin; Lange, Andreas; Sturm, Bodo - 2012
We investigate how burden sharing rules may impact the voluntary provision of a public good which generates heterogeneous benefits to agents. We compare different rule-based contribution schemes that are based on the principle of the smallest common denominator: all agents can suggest a minimum...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010308952