This paper develops a three stage oligopoly game for R&D cooperation, R&D expenditure and product market competition. In the first stage, firms decide whether or not to conduct R&D in cooperation with other firms. In the second stage the level of R&D investment is determined. Finally, firms...

Barriers to entry are regarded as major impediments to the working of markets. Entry must not necessarily actually take place - the perceived threat of entry may encourage incumbent firms to behave as if they are in a competitive market, even if they are not. We present empirical evidence on...

Theory predicts a positive relationship between market concentration and profitability in most scenarios. In empirical work, however, this relation is frequently not found or only a weak connection is observed. We compare the performance of concentration and market share variables, which are...

This paper develops a three stage oligopoly game for R&D cooperation, R&D expenditure and product market competition. In the first stage, firms decide whether or not to conduct R&D in cooperation with other firms. In the second stage the level of R&D investment is determined. Finally, firms...

Theory predicts a positive relationship between market concentration and profitability in most scenarios. In empirical work, however, this relation is frequently not found or only a weak connection is observed. We compare the performance of concentration and market share variables, which are...

Barriers to entry are regarded as major impediments to the working of markets. Entry must not necessarily actually take place - the perceived threat of entry may encourage incumbent firms to behave as if they are in a competitive market, even if they are not. We present empirical evidence on...

This paper studies the incentives to undertake uncertain R&D initiatives in a dynamic duopoly network industry. It is shown that network externalities positively affect the incentives to invest in R&D. In the model, competition resembles a preemption race and, therefore, market performance...

In January 2007, first evidence of an asymmetric pass-through of CO2 emission allowance prices was reported for the German electricity spot market. This paper explores the theoretical basis for such an asymmetry in the context of a supply function bidding duopoly. It interprets fluctuating...

This paper studies the effect of forward contracts on the stability of collusion among firms, competing in supply functions on the spot market. A forward market can increase the range of discount factors which allow to sustain collusion. On the contrary, collusion is destabilised when a...

In January 2007, first evidence of an asymmetric pass-through of CO2 emission allowance prices was reported for the German electricity spot market. This paper explores the theoretical basis for such an asymmetry in the context of a supply function bidding duopoly. It interprets fluctuating...