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Do pay-as-bid auctions favor collusion? : evidence from Germany’s market for reserve power

Heim, Sven; Goetz, Georg - 2013

behavior in an environment with repeated auctions, pivotal suppliers and inelastic demand. The price increase can be traced … back to an abuse of the auction’s pay-as-bid mechanism by the two largest firms. In contrast to theoretical findings, we … show that pay-as-bid auctions do not necessarily reduce incentives for strategic capacity withholding and collusive …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009751726

Legal and illegal cartels in the European cement industry

Fink, Nikolaus; Frübing, Stefan - 2015

Due to being much better documented, legal cartels have recently attracted the interest of many researchers who aim to understand the functioning of illegal cartels in detail. This paper contributes to the question of what we can learn from legal cartels by taking a closer look at the cement...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011334610

Information exchange through non-binding advance price announcements : an antitrust analysis

Boshoff, Willem H.; Frübing, Stefan; Hüschelrath, Kai - 2015

We study the welfare effects of non-binding advance price announcements. Applying a differentiated Bertrand model with horizontal products and asymmetric information, we find that such announcements can help firms to gain information on each other thereby allowing them to achieve higher profits....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011316431

Minority share acquisitions and collusion : evidence from the introduction of national leniency programs

Heim, Sven; Hüschelrath, Kai; Laitenberger, Ulrich; … - 2017

There is a growing concern that minority shareholding (MS) in rival firms may facilitate collusion. To examine this …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011730845

Preferences and decision support in competitive bidding

Fugger, Nicolas; Gillen, Philippe; Rasch, Alexander; … - 2017

We examine bidding behavior in first-price sealed-bid and Dutch auctions, which are strategically equivalent under …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011753992

Airline alliances, antitrust immunity and market foreclosure

Bilotkach, Volodymyr; Hüschelrath, Kai - 2010

This paper examines the issue of market foreclosure by airline partnerships with antitrust immunity. Overlapping the data on frequency of service and passenger volumes on nonstop routes on the transatlantic airline market with the information on dynamics of airline partnerships, we find evidence...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008701357

Antitrust immunity for airline alliances

Bilotkach, Volodymyr; Hüschelrath, Kai - 2010

The market developments in international air transportation have led to the dominance of three global airline alliances – Star, SkyTeam and oneworld. At the same time, members of these alliances receive increasingly more freedom in coordinating various aspects of joint operations, including...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008701367

Registered cartels in Austria : an overview

Fink, Nikolaus; Schmidt-Dengler, Philipp; Stahl, Konrad; … - 2015 - This version: 16 November 2015

contracts, we comprehensively document different collusion methods along the lines described by Stigler (1964). Quota cartels … legally binding agreements was employed to address the usual obstacles to sustaining collusion. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011393136

Do cartel breakdowns induce mergers? : evidence from EC cartel cases

Hüschelrath, Kai; Smuda, Florian - 2013

We investigate the impact of cartel breakdowns on merger activity. Merging information on cartel cases decided by the European Commission (EC) between 2000 and 2011 with a detailed data set of worldwide merger activity, we find that, first, the average number of all merger transactions increase...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009751721

Determinants of self-reporting under the European corporate leniency program

Hoang, Cung Truong; Hüschelrath, Kai; Laitenberger, Ulrich - 2014

We empirically investigate the determinants of self-reporting under the European corporate leniency program. Applying a data set consisting of 442 firm groups that participated in 76 cartels decided by the European Commission between 2000 and 2011, we find that the probability of a firm becoming...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010385205