Corporate credit lines are drawn more heavily when funding markets are more stressed. This covariance elevates expected bank funding costs. We show that credit supply is dampened by the associated debt-overhang cost to bank shareholders. Until 2022, this impact was reduced by linking the...

Corporate credit lines are drawn more heavily when funding markets are more stressed. This covariance elevates expected bank funding costs. We show that credit supply is dampened by the associated debtoverhang cost to bank shareholders. Until 2022, this impact was reduced by linking the interest...

Corporate credit lines are drawn more heavily when funding markets are more stressed. This covariance elevates expected bank funding costs. We show that credit supply is inefficiently dampened by the associated debt-overhang cost to bank shareholders. Until 2022, this impact was reduced by...

Corporate credit lines are drawn more heavily when funding markets are more stressed. This covariance elevates expected bank funding costs. We show that credit supply is dampened by the associated debt-overhang cost to bank shareholders. Until 2022, this impact was reduced by linking the...

We measure credit risk premia---prices for bearing corporate default risk in excess of expected default losses---using Markit CDS and Moody's Analytics EDF data. We find dramatic variation over time in credit risk premia, with peaks in 2002, during the global financial crisis of 2008-09, and in...

For globally systemically important banks (G-SIBs) with U.S. headquarters, we find large post-Lehman reductions in market-implied probabilities of government bailout, along with big increases in debt financing costs for these banks after controlling for insolvency risk. The data are consistent...

Banks and other lenders often transfer credit risk to liberate capital for further loan intermediation. This paper aims to explore the design, prevalence and effectiveness of credit risk transfer (CRT). The focus is on the costs and benefits for the efficiency and stability of the financial...

To address the moral hazard problem that can motivate bank executives to take excessive risks and to fail to raise capital when needed, a group of 13 distinguished financial economists recommends that systemically important financial institutions be required to issue contingent convertible debt...