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Splitting leagues
Kräkel, Matthias - In: Journal of economics 88 (2006) 1, pp. 21-48
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003340115
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U-type versus J-type tournaments
Kräkel, Matthias - 2001
In practice, two types of tournaments can be distinguished - U-type and J-type tournaments. In U-type tournaments …, workers receive prizes that have been fixed in advance. In J-type tournaments, the employer fixes an aggregate wage bill in …-type tournaments if the number of workers is large, whereas the opposite holds for small numbers of workers. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011538870
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Internal labor markets and worker rents
Kräkel, Matthias; Schöttner, Anja - In: Journal of economic behavior & organization : JEBO 84 (2012) 2, pp. 491-509
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009703281
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Splitting leagues
Kräkel, Matthias (contributor) - 2003 - [Elektronische Ressource]
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001828782
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Relative performance pay, bonuses, and job-promotion tournaments
Kräkel, Matthias; Schöttner, Anja - 2008
recruitment is observable on nearly any hierarchy level. We explain these empirical puzzles by combining job-promotion tournaments …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010343925
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Merger performance and managerial incentives
Kräkel, Matthias; Müller, Daniel - 2014
We consider a two-stage principal-agent model with limited liability in which a CEO is employed as agent to gather information about suitable merger targets and to manage the merged corporation in case of an acquisition. Our results show that the CEO systematically recommends targets with low...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011430291
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Limited liability and the risk-incentive relationship
Budde, Jörg; Kräkel, Matthias - 2008
Several empirical findings have challenged the traditional view on the trade-off between risk and incentives. By combining risk aversion and limited liability in a standard principal-agent model the empirical puzzle on the positive relationship between risk and incentives can be explained....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010383018
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Tournaments with gaps
Imhof, Lorens; Kräkel, Matthias - 2013
A standard tournament contract specifies only tournament prizes. If agents' performance is measured on a cardinal scale, the principal can complement the tournament contract by a gap which defines the minimum distance by which the best performing agent must beat the second best to receive the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010198511
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Merger efficiency and managerial incentives
Kräkel, Matthias; Müller, Daniel - 2013
We consider a two-stage principal-agent model with limited liability in which a CEO is employed as agent to gather information about suitable merger targets and to manage the merged corporation in case of an acquisition. Our results show that the CEO systematically recommends targets with low...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010198514
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Bad mergers revisited : an incentive perspective ; conference paper
Kräkel, Matthias; Müller, Daniel - 2013
We consider a two-stage principal-agent model with limited liability in which a CEO is employed as agent to gather information about suitable merger targets and to manage the merged corporation in case of an acquisition. Our results show that the CEO systematically recommends targets with low...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010340013