V článku navrhujeme tři metody přepočtu hlasů na mandáty pro volby do Poslanecké sněmovny Parlamentu ČR (PS PČR) založené na metodách matematického programování. Důvod pro jejich zavedení spatřujeme v tom, že běžně používané metody přepočtu hlasů na mandáty často...

The paper deals with lobbying in the EU and CR. The starting point is the selected definitions of lobbying and lobbying efforts to integrate into the broader context of promoting economic interests in society. The text therefore considers the criteria for defining lobbying, the defining of the...

The core aim of this paper is to suggest comprehensive definition of the information economy and delineate the range of economic problems it deals with, paying particular attention to its connections to the economics of information. The text, in the extent provided, can not investigate...

The St Petersburg paradox could be used as an extreme demonstration of the utility function cardinalisation in case of stochastic utility. In this article we reassume the von Neumann and Mongernstern explanation to this paradox based on the risk aversion expressed by the strict concavity of the...

This paper shows results of comparison of the original theoretical conception of modeling human decisions under risk with two well known models. In the paper the demand function for insurance is constructed for the model of maximization of the probability of agent’s (economical) survival. This...

One of the key assumptions of neoclassical economics is the existence of the rational individual, who always tries to maximize his or her utility. The paper shows possibilities of experimental evaluation of this hypothesis with respect to the various groups of people who undertake the...

We examine a strategic-choice handicap model in which males send costly signals to advertise their quality to females. Females are concerned with the net viability of the male with whom they mate, where net viability is a function of the male's quality and signal. We identify circumstances in...

We present a model of learning in which agents learn from errors. If an action turns out to be an error, the agent rejects not only that action but also neighboring actions. We find that, keepng memory of his errors, under mild assumptions an acceptable solution is asymptotically reached....