This paper investigates the effect of Morningstar ratings on mutual fund manager replacement. We find that not only do Morningstar ratings affect the likelihood fund managers are replaced, but that Morningstar ratings are better predictors of manager replacement than alternative measures of fund...

This paper investigates the effect of Morningstar ratings on mutual fund manager replacement. We find that not only do Morningstar ratings affect the likelihood fund managers are replaced, but that Morningstar ratings are better predictors of manager replacement than alternative measures of fund...

We present a modified principal-agent model to identify a link between the anticipated likelihood of future CEO turnover and the optimal sensitivity of incentive pay to firm performance. The analysis focuses on the optimal sequence of standard one-period incentive contracts when CEO effort...

While previous research has suggested the coincidence of CEO turnover and real changes in firm operations such as discontinued operations, we demonstrate that such findings apply only to specific types of CEO turnover, and only if other top executives also exit the firm. Categorizing specific...

In this study, we examine the three components of executive compensation including salary, equity, and bonus pay over a CEO’s tenure for US publicly-traded firms. We confirm a positive and significant relationship between two separate measures of firm performance and incentive pay. We also...