We identify a mistake in the specification of the demand system used in the strategic delegation model based on market shares by Jansen et al. (2007), whereby the price remains above marginal cost when goods are homogeneous. After amending this aspect, we perform a profit comparison with the...

In this paper we are analyzing a mixed quantity-setting duopoly consisting of a socially concerned firm and a profit maximizing firm. The socially concerned firm considers one group of stakeholders in its objective function and maximizes its profit plus a share of consumer surplus. Both firms...

In this paper we study the conditions under which socially responsible firms can develop a first-mover advantage. We consider a price-setting duopoly market with vertically and horizontally differentiated products, where firms can engage in socially responsible activities and thereby increase...

The observability of managerial contract information in duopolies with strategic delegation has been an issue of controversial discussion. In a recent paper, Baik and Lee (2019) endogenize the decision to disclose the details of managerial contracts and show that in equilibrium, the owners of...

Nonprofit organizations have been recently mandated to disclose the details of their executives' compensation packages. Contract information is now accessible not only to current and prospective donors, but also to rival nonprofit organizations competing for donations in the fundraising market....

I study the endogenous choice of a price or quantity contract in a mixed duopoly with a socially concerned firm which maximizes a combination of profit and consumer welfare. Contrasting the literature, I find that equilibria where firms adopt price contracts and quantity contracts might coexist....

The literature on voluntary disclosure in oligopolies concentrates either on Cournot markets where firms compete in quantities or on Bertrand markets where firms compete in prices. In this paper we study voluntary disclosure of managerial contract information in a Cournot-Bertrand duopoly where...

We introduce a mixed quantity-setting duopoly with a socially concerned firm and a profit-maximizing firm to derive a firms' optimal combination of the organization's type, the structure of managerial compensation and its manager's type. Both firms delegate the quantity choice to managers who...

We study how managerial bargaining power affects outcomes and payoffs in a Hotelling-type duopoly framework with restricted and unrestricted locations. We show that bargaining power only affects the distribution of the surplus between owners and managers, but does not affect the locations,...

We show that Miller and Pazgal's (2001) model of strategic delegation, in which managerial incentives are based upon relative performance, is affected by a non-existence problem which has impact on the price equilibrium. The undercutting incentives generating this result are indeed similar to...