The paper compares the Nash bargaining solution of a simple settlement game (with perfect and complete information and imperfect decision making judges) to the equilibrium results of a trial game without settlement stage. The comparison allows for an evaluation of the efficiency of settlement...

Governments may draft contracts with market agents for allocating subsidies and pursuing specific policy goals. Contract enforcement via binding commitments is difficult, however, when exogenous (environmental) and endogenous (behavioural) risks interact. Analyzing the old debt compromise in...

Governments may draft contracts with market agents for allocating subsidies and pursuing specific policy goals. Contract enforcement via binding commitments is difficult, however, when exogenous (environmental) and endogenous (behavioural) risks interact. Analyzing the old debt compromise in...

By viewing negotiation problems as problems of fair division, one can apply intuitive procedures to a variety of complex conflicts. This, however, requires the negotiated issues to be interpreted as items to be divided among the parties involved. In this paper, we go in the opposite direction...

Die Abhandlung zeigt für wiederholbare Prozesse eine universell anwendbare Ableitung eines Rechenalgorhithmus auf, mit dem unter Annahme einer Wahrscheinlichkeitsverteilung mögliche Plan-Istabweichungen und Aufallkosten zu einem Gleichgewicht und damit zu einem Ergebnisoptimunm führen....

With non-controllable auto-regressive shocks, the welfare of Ramsey optimal policy is the solution of a single Riccati equation of a linear quadratic regulator. The existing theory by Hansen and Sargent (2007) refers to an additional Sylvester equation but miss another equation for computing the...