This paper explores the potential of microfinance in post-conflict economies, and speci-fically examines policy considerations for the case of Iraq. It presents important condi-tions of the post-conflict economy, and examines three critical requirements for suc-cessful microfinance operations,...

We test whether firms with a single bank are better shielded from loss of credit and investment cutsin periods of adverse cash flow shocks than firms with multiple bank relationships. Our estimatesof the cash flow sensitivity of investment show that both types of firms are equally subject...

This study explores individual and country-level environmental drivers of informal “seed” investment. We examine four types of informal investors based on business ownership experience (or no such experience) and close family relationship with investee (or no such relationship): “classic love...

The Small Business Service (SBS) commissioned York Consulting Limited(YCL) to carry out an early assessment of the Company Rescue Schemepilots.Concerns have been expressed that a large number of small firms capable ofbeing turned around are being wound up unnecessarily due to a lack...

In this paper we empirically examine the impact of competition between Microfinance Institutions(MFIs) on the efficacy of loan contracts when the MFIs make use of joint liability loan contracts. Morespecifically, we aim to find out whether competition will reduce the power of the self-selection...

A widely recognized paper by Colin Mayer (1988) has led to a profound revision of academic thinking about financing patterns of corporations in different countries. Using flow-of-funds data instead of balance sheet data, Mayer and others who followed his lead found that internal financing is the...

In this paper we analyze how a firm might protect quasi-rents in an environmentof imperfect capital markets, where switching lenders is costly to the borrower, andcontracts are incomplete. As switching costs make the firm vulnerable to ex-postexploitation, it may want to diversify lending in...

This paper develops a principal-agent model of financial contracting in which optimal contracts resemble a combination of debt and equity. When defaulting on debt, the firm is punished by disruption of external funding. Such contracts however, invite rivals to compete more aggressively to...

This paper deals with optimal financial contracts which simultaneously provide payincentives and impose constraints on managerial control.