Die vor rund zehn Jahren eingeführte W-Besoldung weist gegenüber der vorhergehenden C-Besoldung einige Vor- und Nachteile auf. Nach ökonomischen Vorüberlegungen und einer kurzen Vorstellung der beiden Besoldungssysteme werden diese Unterschiede betrachtet und Empfehlungen formuliert.

One of the main issues of the reform regarding a professor’s remuneration at German universities is the introduction of a performance-dependent salary. This paper applies relative rank order tournaments to special performance benefits at university level. It turns out that the awarding...

This paper analyzes how faculty members dynamically allocate their efforts between improving their research and teaching skills, taking into account the organizational structures and incentives implemented by academic institutions. The model builds on the assumption that organizational...

Within the perimeter of French higher education, the elite business schools have four distinctive characteristics : they are free to select their students ; they price the tuition fees at an unusually high rate ; they manage their faculty outside the rules of the civil service status ; they...

Many organizations rely on teamwork, and yet field evidence on the impacts of team-based incentives remains scarce. Compared to individual incentives, team incentives can affect productivity by changing both workers’ effort and team composition. We present evidence from a field experiment...

We consider a managerial optimal framework for top executive compensation, where top management sets their own compensation subject to limited entrenchment, instead of the conventional setting where such compensation is set by a board that maximizes firm value. Top management would like to pay...

The quot;Lake Wobegon Effect,quot; which is widely cited as a potential cause for rising CEO pay, is said to occur because no firm wants to admit to having a CEO who is below average, and so no firm allows its CEO's pay package to lag market expectations. We develop a game-theoretic model of...

We explore the timing of the replacement of a manager as an important incentive mechanism, using a real options approach in a situation where the timing of the decision to replace the manager is related to a major change in a firm's strategies that involves spending large amounts of various sunk...

Managers appear to manipulate firm earnings through their characterizations of pension assets to capital markets and alter investment decisions to justify, and capitalize on, these manipulations. Managers are more aggressive with assumed long-term rates of return when their assumptions have a...

Managers appear to manipulate firm earnings through their characterizations of pension assets to capital markets and alter investment decisions to justify, and capitalize on, these manipulations. Managers are more aggressive with assumed long-term rates of return when their assumptions have a...