We study peer effects in crime by analyzing co-offending networks. We first provide a credible estimate of peer effects in these networks equal to 0.17. This estimate implies a social multiplier of 1.2 for those individuals linked to only one co-offender and a social multiplier of 2 for those...

We provide an overview and synthesis of the literatures analyzing games in which players are connected via a network structure. We discuss, in particular, the impact of the structure of the network on individuals’ behaviors. We focus on game theoretic modeling, but also include some discussion...

We survey the literature on social networks by putting together the economics, sociological and physics/applied mathematics approaches, showing their similarities and differences. We expose, in particular, the two main ways of modeling network formation. While the physics/applied mathematics...

We survey the literature on social networks by putting together the economics, sociological and physics/applied mathematics approaches, showing their similarities and differences. We expose, in particular, the two main ways of modeling network formation. While the physics/applied mathematics...

We study peer effects in crime by analyzing co-offending networks. We first provide a credible estimate of peer effects in these networks equal to 0.17. This estimate implies a social multiplier of 1.2 for those individuals linked to only one co-offender and a social multiplier of 2 for those...

We adopt the notion of myopic-farsighted stable set to study the stability of networks when myopic and farsighted individuals decide with whom they want to form a link, according to some utility function that weighs the costs and benefits of each connection. A myopic-farsighted stable set is the...

We study a coordination game on a fixed connected network where players have to choose between two projects. Some players are moderate (i.e. they are ex-ante indifferent between both project) while others are stubborn (i.e. they always choose the same project). Benefits for moderate players are...

We reconsider de Marti and Zenou (2017) model of friendship network formation where individuals belong to two different communities. Benefits from direct and indirect connections decay with distance while costs of forming links depend on community memberships. Individuals are now either...

We propose a new concept, the pairwise farsightedly stable set, in order to predict which networks may be formed among farsighted players. A set of networks G is pairwise farsightedly stable (i) if all possible pairwise deviations from any network g - G to a network outside G are deterred by the...

This paper shows that the relationship between social networks and cooperative trading is a two-way street. The possibility of cooperative trading enforced by third-party sanctions provides players with incentives to form costly links, and investing in costly links increases the power of...