A common feature of the literature on the evolution of preferencesis that evolution favors nonmaterialistic preferences only if preferencetypes are observable at least to some degree. We argue that this resultis due to the assumption that in each state of the evolutionary dynam-ics some Bayesian...

We set up a two-stage game with sequential moves by one altruistic agent andn selfish agents. The rotten kid theorem states that the altruist can only reach her firstbest when the selfish agents move before the altruist. The Samaritan’s dilemma, on theother hand, states that the altruist can...

To explain why pre-play communication increases cooperation in games,one refers to a) strategic causes such as efficient communication or reputationeffects, and b) changes in the utilities due to social processes. Hithertoexperimental support for both explanations is mixed and confounded....

We analyze the effects of introducing asymmetric information and expectations in the investment game (Berg et al., 1995). In our experiment, only the trustee knows the size of the surplus. Subjects' expectations about each other's behavior are also elicited. (...)

We run a computerised experiment of network formation where allconnections are bene…cial and only direct links are costly. Players simul-taneously submit link proposals; a connection is made only when bothplayers involved agree. We use both simulated and experimentally gen-erated data to test...