Similar Search Results

The investment game with asymmetric information

Coricelli, Giorgi; Morales, Luis Gonzalez; Mahlstedt, Amelie - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2003

We analyze the effects of introducing asymmetric information andexpectations in the investment game (Berg et al., 1995). In our experiment,only the trustee knows the size of the surplus. Subjects’expectations about each other’s behavior are also elicited. Our resultsshow that average payback...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866876

The investment game with asymmetric information

Coricelli, Giorgio; González Morales, Luis G.; … - 2003

We analyze the effects of introducing asymmetric information and expectations in the investment game (Berg et al., 1995). In our experiment, only the trustee knows the size of the surplus. Subjects' expectations about each other's behavior are also elicited. (...)

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005845178

Age and the development of trust and reciprocity

Sutter, Matthias; Kocher, Martin G. - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2003

We examine the degree of trust and reciprocity in an experimental trust game with 662 participants from six different … age groups, ranging from 8 year old primary school children to retired persons in their late sixties. Although both trust … research has devoted surprisingly little attention to their development with age. Our results provide clear evidence that trust …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866861

Age and the development of trust and reciprocity

Sutter, Matthias; Kocher, Martin G. - 2003

We examine the degree of trust and reciprocity in an experimental trust game with 662 participants from six different …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005845176

Context and Interpretation in Laboratory Experiments:The Case of Reciprocity

Levati, Maria Vittoria; Miettinen, Topi; Rai, Birendra K. - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2010

The existing literature acknowledges that a mismatch between the experimenter'sand the subjects' models of an experimental task can adversely aect the interpretation ofdata from laboratory experiments. We discuss why the two common experimental designs(between-subjects and within-subjects) used...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009248911

Trust in cooperation or ability? - An experimental study on gender differences

Schwieren, Christiane; Sutter, Matthias - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2003

We examine experimentally two different types of trust: trust in another party's cooperation and trust in ability. In …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866903

Are we nice(r) to nice(r) people? An Experimental Analysis

Albert, Max; Güth, Werner; Kirchler, Erich; … - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2002

by allowing participants to condition their choices in an asymmetric prisoner's dilemma and a trust game (i) on their …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005867074

Trust in cooperation or ability? - An experimental study on gender differences

Schwieren, Christiane; Sutter, Matthias - 2003

We examine experimentally two different types of trust: trust in another party's cooperation and trust in ability. In …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005845180

Measuring Individual Risk Attitudes in the Lab: Task orAsk? An Empirical Comparison

Lönnqvist, Jan-Erik; Verkasalo, Markku; Walkowitz, Gari; … - Cologne Graduate School in Management, Economics and … - 2011

the lab | herethe amount sent in a trust game (Berg, Dickaut, McCabe, 1995). As it turns out,the measures themselves are …. Moreover, with respect to trust, the highre-test stability of trust transfers (p = :70) further supports the conjecture that …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009302654

The Hidden Costs of Control:An Unsuccessful Replication Study

Ploner, Matteo; Ziegelmeyer, Anthony - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2007

This note reports a replication study of Falk and Kosfeld’s (2006) medium control treatment.In the experimental game, an agent has an endowment of 120 experimental currency units anddecides how much to transfer to a principal. For every unit that the agent gives up, the principalreceives two...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866534