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Politicians and firms

Shleifer, Andrei; Vishny, Robert W. - 1994

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000893759

The grabbing hand : government pathologies and their cures

Shleifer, Andrei; Vishny, Robert W. - 1998

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000659848

Second-best economic policy for a divided government

Bojko, Maksim V. - In: European economic review : EER 40 (1996) 3, pp. 767-774

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001205218

Politicians and firms

Shleifer, Andrei - In: The quarterly journal of economics 109 (1994) 4, pp. 995-1025

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001173395

Efficiency losses from tax distortions vs. government control

Gordon, Roger H.; Bai, Chong-En; Li, David D. - In: European economic review : EER 43 (1999) 4/6, pp. 1095-1103

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001407669

Efficiency Losses from Tax Distortions vs. Government Control

Bai, Chong-En; Gordon, Roger H.; Li, David D. - 1999

Why has the rapid privatization of firms in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union not brought dramatically higher … performance as expected? If private ownership were so clearly dominant, why has state control of enterprises been such a common … tax rates. For good reasons, privatization is normally associated with sharp drops in tax and nontax distortions. When …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014194448

A Multi-Task Theory of the State Enterprise Reform

Bai, Chong-En; Li, David D.; Tao, Zhigang; Wang, Yijiang - 2001

During transition, maintaining employment and providing a social safety net to the unemployed are important to social stability, which in turn is crucial for the productivity of the whole economy. Because independent institutions for social safety are lacking and firms with strong profit...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014144003

The System of Incentives for Managers with Multitasks : Theory and Evidence from Chinese State-Owned Enterprises

Bai, Chong-En; Xu, Lixin Colin - 2001

The multitask principal-agent theory argues that incentive devices for the agent tend to be complementary due to the need for balanced allocation of effort among the tasks. A growing body of empirical literature appears to support this notion. However, when there can be several signals for each...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014124916

The System of Incentives for CEOS with Multitasks : Theory and Evidence from Chinese State-Owned Enterprises

Bai, Chong-En; Xu, Lixin Colin - 2003

The multitask agency theory argues that incentive devices for the agent need to be viewed as a system to induce balanced allocation of effort among the tasks. This important insight has not been incorporated into the empirical study of CEO compensation. Since there can be several measures for...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014084983

The proper scope of government : theory and an application to prisons

Hart, Oliver D.; Shleifer, Andrei; Vishny, Robert W. - 1996

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000604001