The paper presents both the New Consensus and Keynesian equilibrium within the usual fourcompetitive macro-markets structure. It gives theoretical explanations of the perniciouseffects that the NCM governance, which has been designed for ergodic stationary regimes,brings about in Keynesian...

Because it was designed for efficient stationary regimes, the New-Consensus Macroeconomic governance carries several drawbacks when implemented in Keynesian non-ergodic regimes. As long as Keynesian unemployment is interpreted in terms of 'natural' rate, it serves as a macroeconomic policy...

Extending Asensio's closed-economy framework (2005a,b) to a monetary union, we show that theprinciples of governance which emanate from the so called "New Consensus in Macroeconomics"(NCM), and therefore have been designed for presumed stationary regimes, may cause severedysfunctions, such as...

Contrasting with the 1929 great crisis, authorities intervened forcefully in 2008 to stop the disintegration of the financial system. Governments and central banks then sought to revise the prudential regulation in depth. It would be optimistic, however, to believe that prudential measures,...

The paper discusses the possible economic consequences of the financial crisis from a (Post)Keynesian point of view. It examines the forthcoming depressive mechanisms, including the orthodox reactions of monetary and fiscal authorities, in the vein of those inferred in Europe by the mandate of...