This study examines whether top managerial executive envy plays an important role in merger waves. Since managerial benefits, especially compensation, always increase with firm size, the envy hypothesis conjectures that top executive officers rush into acquisitions due to their envious...

This paper uses novel data to examine the fleets of corporate jets operated by both publicly traded and privately held firms. In the cross-section, firms owned by private equity funds average 40% smaller fleets than observably similar public firms. Similar fleet reductions are observed within...

India is the fastest growing economy post its liberalization and globalization activism and Asia's third largest economy behind Japan and China. India's telecom density is not so high as compared to the western market. Many companies are easily attracted to the telecom sector and are interested...

Using block share acquisitions made by private equity (PE) funds, we examine the sources of value gains in PE minority equity investments. We find that the targets in PE acquisitions, particularly poorly performing targets, targets with high R&D intensity, and targets whose boards have...

We explore the valuation, tax and post-merger performance consequences of M&As with tax haven firms. Using an international sample of cross-border mergers over the period 1989 to 2010, we find that acquirers of tax haven firms decrease their effective tax rates significantly in two years...

“Common Ownership” is a phenomenon where shareholders hold substantial stakes in firms that impose externalities on each other. The “Common Ownership” hypothesis suggests that these shareholders may internalize some of these externalities amongst their portfolio firms. While most of the...

This paper shows that coordinated monitoring by institutional investors affects how firms behave in the M&A market. We employ the spatial dimension of geographic links between major institutions as a proxy for interaction and information exchange—a process that determines the effectiveness of...

Corporate governance systems exist to discourage self-interested behavior. One question that is often overlooked is how extensive these systems should be. A look at corporate governance today suggests that self-interest is high because companies are compelled - by regulators and the market - to...

For the past 30 years, the conventional wisdom has been that executive compensation packages should include very large proportions of incentive pay. This incentive pay orthodoxy has become so firmly entrenched that the current debates about executive compensation simply take it as a given. We...