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Platform interconnection and quality incentives
Salim, Claudia - 2008
invest in Platform quality. We find that interconnection is aa means to reduce externalities one side exerts on the other. It … changes the mode of competition for subscribers and resultsin higher subscription prices. Further, even though interconnection … quality costs it will lead to asymmetric networks. Therefore, interconnection without coordinated investment activities is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003797957
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Platform standards, collusion and quality incentives
Salim, Claudia - 2009
This paper examines how quality incentives are related to the interoperability of competing platforms. Platforms choose whether to operate standardised or exclusively, prior to quality and subsequent price competition. We find that platforms choose a common standard if they can coordinate their...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003848849
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Compatibility and Proprietary Standards : The Impact of Conversion Technologies in IT Markets with Network Effects
Liu, Charles Z.; Gal-Or, Esther; Kemerer, Chris F.; … - 2014
In markets that exhibit network effects, the presence of digital conversion technologies provides an alternative mechanism to achieve compatibility. This study examines the impact of conversion technologies on market equilibrium in the context of sequential duopoly competition and proprietary...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014051431
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Bertrand competition in markets with network effects and switching costs
Suleymanova, Irina; Wey, Christian - 2011
We analyze Bertrand duopoly competition in markets with network effects and consumer switching costs. Depending on the ratio of switching costs to network effects, our model generates four different market patterns: monopolization and market sharing which can be either monotone or alternating. A...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009236846
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One-Way Compatibility, Two-Way Compatibility and Entry in Network Industries
Manenti, Fabio M. - 2011
We study the strategic choice of compatibility between two initially incompatible network goods in a two-stage game played by an incumbent and an entrant firm. Compatibility may be achieved by means of a converter. We derive a number of results under different assumptions about the nature of the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013124727
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Bertrand Competition in Markets with Network Effects and Switching Costs
Suleymanova, Irina - 2008
We analyze market dynamics under Bertrand duopoly competition in industries with network effects and consumer switching costs. Consumers form installed bases, repeatedly buy the products, and differ with respect to their switching costs. Depending on the ratio of switching costs to network...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012724212
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On the (Mis-) Alignment of Consumer and Social Welfare in Markets with Network Effects
Suleymanova, Irina; Wey, Christian - 2008
We analyze duopoly Bertrand competition under network effects. We consider both incompatible and compatible products. Our main result is that network effects create a fundamental conflict between the maximization of social welfare and consumer surplus whenever products are incompatible. While...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014217962
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On Vertical Product Differentiation, Network Externalities and Compatibility Decisions : Existence of Incompatible Networks
Sarkar, Sumit - 2005
Market mechanism may or may not throw up compatibility in markets for systems where network effect arises due to complementarity of component parts of a system. We consider a game, where, in stage 1, the firms decide whether to standardise on a single technological platform or not and at the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014070892
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One-Way Compatibility, Two-Way Compatibility and Entry in Network Industries
Manenti, Fabio M.; Somma, Ernesto - 2008
We study the strategic choice of compatibility between two initially incompatible network goods in a two-stage game played by an incumbent and an entrant firm. Compatibility may be achieved by means of a converter. We derive a number of results under different assumptions about the nature of the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014029696
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Standards Coalitions Formation and Market Structure in Network Industries
Economides, Nicholas; Skrzypacz, Andrzej - 2008
We discuss the formation of technical standards platforms in industries with network externalities where firms are free to choose their degree of technical compatibility with competitors. In our model, firms choose affiliation to a technical standards coalition in the first stage of a game, and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014031205