We consider an infinitely-repeated Bertrand game, in which prices are perfectly observed and each firm receives a privately-observed, i.i.d. cost shock in each period. We focus on symmetric perfect public equilibria (SPPE), wherein any "punishments" are borne equally by all firms. We identify a...

We consider an infinitely-repeated Bertrand game, in which prices are perfectly observed and each firm receives a privately-observed, i.i.d. cost shock in each period. We focus on symmetric perfect public equilibria (SPPE), wherein any "punishments" are borne equally by all firms. We identify a...

We present a theory of collusive pricing for markets in which demand alternates stochastically between fast-growth (boom) and slow-growth (recession) phases. We show that 1) the most collusive prices are weakly procyclical (countercyclical) when demand growth rates are positively (negatively)...