We present a model where firms compete for scarce managerial talent ("alpha") and managers are risk-averse. When … managers cannot move across firms after being hired, employers learn about their talent, allocate them efficiently to projects … and provide insurance to low-quality managers. When instead managers can move across firms, firm-level coinsurance is no …

We present a model where firms compete for scarce managerial talent ("alpha") and managers are risk-averse. When … managers cannot move across firms after being hired, employers learn about their talent, allocate them efficiently to projects … and provide insurance to low-quality managers. When instead managers can move across firms, firm-level coinsurance is no …

We present a model in which managers are risk-averse and firms compete for scarce managerial talent ("alpha"). When … managers are not mobile across firms, firms provide efficient compensation, which allows for learning about managerial talent … and for insurance of low-quality managers. When instead managers can move across firms, firms cannot offer co …

We present a model in which managers are risk-averse and firms compete for scarce managerial talent ("alpha"). When … managers are not mobile across firms, firms provide efficient compensation, which allows for learning about managerial talent … and for insurance of low-quality managers. When instead managers can move across firms, firms cannot offer co …