Economists broadly agree that the economic burden of corporate taxes is not entirely borne by shareholders, but also borne in part by employees or consumers. We model corporate tax avoidance in a setting where shareholders do not bear the entire economic burden of the corporate tax. We show the...

Economists broadly agree that the economic burden of corporate taxes is not entirely borne by shareholders, but also borne in part by employees and consumers. We examine corporate tax avoidance in a setting where shareholders do not bear the entire economic burden of the corporate tax. We show...

The limitation of executive compensation has been a matter of public and policy debate for at least 20 years. We examine a first-time regulatory action where the deductibility of the total value of executive compensation is limited and unavoidable. We find that, rather than reduce remuneration,...

We examine whether consumers bear corporate taxes through higher prices. Using data on the gas prices of German gas stations and local variation in business tax rates, we find that higher business taxes increase consumer prices, indicating corporate taxes fall partly on consumers. Prices...

This paper analyzes the sources of heterogeneity in legal tax avoidance strategies across individuals. Three conditions are required for a taxpayer to participate in tax avoidance: incentive, access, and awareness. Using rich Swedish administrative panel data with a unique link between corporate...

This paper analyzes the sources of heterogeneity in legal tax avoidance strategies across individuals. Three conditions are required for a taxpayer to participate in tax avoidance: incentive, access, and awareness. Using rich Swedish administrative panel data with a unique link between corporate...

In a real-effort laboratory experiment to manipulate evasion opportunities, we study whether the moral evaluation of tax evasion is subject to a self-serving bias. We find that tax morale is egoistically biased: Subjects with the opportunity to evade taxes judge tax evasion as less unethical as...

In a real-effort laboratory experiment to manipulate evasion opportunities, we study whether the moral evaluation of tax evasion is subject to a self-serving bias. We find that tax morale is egoistically biased: Subjects with the opportunity to evade taxes judge tax evasion as less unethical as...

Economists broadly agree that the economic burden of corporate taxes is not entirely borne by shareholders but also borne in part by employees and consumers. We examine corporate tax avoidance in a setting where shareholders do not bear the entire economic burden of the corporate tax. We show...