We study the effects of revenue-neutral labor tax reforms in an imperfectly competitive domestic labor market under Nash wage bargaining and flexible outsourcing. A revenue-neutral increase in the wage tax progression will decrease the negotiated wage rate, increase domestic labor demand and...

We study the effects of revenue-neutral labor tax reforms in an imperfectly competitive domestic labor market under Nash wage bargaining and flexible outsourcing. A revenue-neutral increase in the wage tax progression will decrease the negotiated wage rate, increase domestic labor demand and...

This paper uses a union bargaining framework, where the wage rate is negotiated between the representatives of employees and employers and firms unilaterally determine employment, to discuss the relationship between labour taxation and employment. In imperfectly competitive labour markets higher...

This paper uses a union bargaining framework, where the wage rate is negotiated between the representatives of employees and employers and firms unilaterally determine employment, to discuss the relationship between labour taxation and employment. In imperfectly competitive labour markets higher...

It has been argued recently that imposing taxes on pollution produces additional tax revenues, which can then be used to replace labor taxes and thus reap a double dividend in the form of improving environmental quality and alleviating unemployment. This paper analyzes the employment effects of...

We study the joint design of nonlinear income and education taxes when the government pursues redistributive objectives. A key feature of our setup is that the ability type of an agent can affect both the costs and benefits of acquiring education. Market remuneration of agents depends on both...

We study the joint design of nonlinear income and education taxes when the government pursues redistributive objectives. A key feature of our setup is that the ability type of an agent can affect both the costs and benefits of acquiring education. Market remuneration of agents depends on both...

We study the joint design of nonlinear income and education taxes when the government pursues redistributive objectives. A key feature of our setup is that the ability type of an agent can affect both the costs and benefits of acquiring education. Market remuneration of agents depends on both...