China's extremely high levels of urban air, water and greenhouse gas emissions levels pose local and global environmental challenges. China's urban leaders have substantial influence and discretion over the evolution of economic activity that generates such externalities. This paper examines the...

At political boundaries, local leaders often have weak incentives to reduce polluting activity because the social costs are borne by downstream neighbors. This paper exploits a natural experiment set in China in which the central government changed the local political promotion criteria and...

This paper is a comment on "Incentives and Outcomes: China's Environmental Policy" by Jing Wu, Yongheng Deng, Jun Huang, Randall Morck, and Bernard Yeung which can be found at: "http://ssrn.com/abstract=2399048" http://ssrn.com/abstract=2399048

China's environmental regulators have sought to reduce the Yangtze River's water pollution. We document that this regulatory effort has had two unintended consequences. First, the regulation's spatial differential stringency has displaced economic activity upstream. As polluting activity...

China's environmental regulators have sought to reduce the Yangtze River's water pollution. We document that this regulatory effort has had two unintended consequences. First, the regulation's spatial differential stringency has displaced economic activity upstream. As polluting activity...