We recommend a Bretton Woods system along structural lines. A key component of the case is the substitution of the money transmission mechanism by the credit transmission mechanism. We suggest that the real exchange rate be the variable of cooperation between countries that are free to set...

We show that the interest rate cannot both coordinate the savings plans of borrowers and lenders and equal the marginal product of capital.

We offer an explanation, drawn from first principles, of the belief that the consumption needs of the asset-poor are best met by debt contracts, whereas equity arrangements are tailored to the financing requirements of poor entrepreneurs.

We appraise the canonical Robertson­Keynes discussion from the structural axis of exogeneity/endogeneity of the interest rate. The interest rate is shown to be an exogenous variable. It is only with Keynes’ contribution of liquidity preference and, specifically, the introduction of the...

We model the interaction between capitalists and entrepreneurs as a dynamic game. The open-loop Nash equilibrium and the closed-loop Nash equilibrium are distinguished. The elasticity of intertemporal substitution as well as the level and responsiveness of the wage rate to the accumulation of...

We decompose the representative agent into her manager, worker and rentier selves. The criterion is the information set of each of the 'incarnations' at every stage of a repeated game. The rentier's information set includes anticipating information while the information set of the other agents...

We provide an explicit derivation of the conjecture that due to the asymmetric information that characterizes the relationship between bank and borrower monetary policy will be less than fully expansionary.

The institutional combination of illiquid assets and demand deposit banking is regarded as vulnerable to collapse because of the impatience of depositors. We suggest that the mechanism of fully backed central bank money is a means of redress.

We examine solutions in which neither player is worse off from the leadership of one in a policy maker-public game. The loop model of dynamic games is used. Outcome space is dotted with equivalence classes of solutions. The Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) results and their New...

We propose a simple framework within which to examine the problem of policy coordination between two central banks. The context is the various components of a broad measure of the money supply. Consider two central banks, one'monetarist' and the other 'Keynesian'. In each economy there is...