This paper presents the empirical phase diagram showing the cooperation phase, the mixed phase and the defection phase of prisoner's dilemma experiment. The empirical data includes 21 experiments using a total of 350 human subjects. Experimental parameters are the possibility of continuation...

We report experimental results for a twice-played prisoners' dilemma in which the players can choose the allocation of the stakes across the two periods. Our point of departure is the assumption that some (but not all) people are principled to “do the right thing,” or cooperate, as long as...

Reanalyzing 12 experiments on the repeated prisoner's dilemma (PD), we robustly observe three distinct subject types: defectors, cautious cooperators and strong cooperators. The strategies used by these types are surprisingly stable across experiments and uncorrelated with treatment parameters,...

Reanalyzing 12 experiments on the repeated prisoner's dilemma (PD), we robustly observe three distinct subject types: defectors, cautious cooperators and strong cooperators. The strategies used by these types are surprisingly stable across experiments and uncorrelated with treatment parameters,...

Exogenously given reputational information is known to improve cooperation. This paper experimentally studies how people create such information through reporting of partner's action choices, and whether the endogenous monitoring helps sustain cooperation, in an indefinitely repeated prisoner's...

This study presents experimental results on the role that non-binding pledges have on the ability of resource users to manage the threat of probabilistic group damages in two separate environments. First, an environment where agents can work collectively to try to mitigate the root cause of the...

This experiment investigates a stochastic version of the infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma.The stochastic element introduces the importance of beliefs about the future for supportingcooperation as well as cooperation and defection on the equilibrium path. There is more coop-eration in...

Subjects who played a payoff-maximising strategy against a computer algorithm ("sophisticates") are more cooperative in a finitely repeated Prisoner's Dilemma than subjects who did not play a payoff-maximising strategy ("naifs"). The difference in cooperation rates increases as the subjects gain...

We aim to understand the role and evolution of beliefs in the indefinitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma (IRPD). To do so, we elicit beliefs about the supergame strategies chosen by others. We find that heterogeneity in beliefs and changes in beliefs with experience are central to understanding...