Showing 1 - 6 of 6
This paper shows, for the first time, how liquidity infusions from government bailouts affect loan modification in the mortgage market. The design of the Pooling and Service Agreement leads mortgage servicers to prefer foreclosure to modification when the servicers are liquidity constrained....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012972902
We find that regulators can implement identical rules inconsistently due to differences in their institutional design and incentives and this behavior adversely impacts the effectiveness with which regulation is implemented. We study supervisory decisions of U.S. banking regulators and exploit a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013091882
While reliance on human discretion is a pervasive feature of institutional design, human discretion can also introduce costly noise (Kahneman, Sibony, and Sunstein 2021). We evaluate the consequences, determinants, and trade-offs associated with discretion in high-stake decisions assessing bank...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014528383
Using administrative account level data, we study the largest financial inclusion program in India that led to 255 million new bank account openings. About 77% of these accounts maintain a positive balance. While the initial usage remains quite infrequent, it gradually converges to that of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012964578
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011964626
with the S&L crisis during the 1980s and 1990s on banking supervision in their later careers. We find regulators with … supervision. Such an effect is stronger for male regulators with crisis experiences and those aged between 35 and 45. In addition …, these regulators are less susceptible to the revolving door problem and therefore more independent in the supervision …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014256541