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communicated might matter. In a controlled field experiment, we study a minimally invasive change in the communication of a well …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011285314
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We study communication in a two-player coordination game with Pareto-ranked equilibria. Prior research demonstrates … that efficient coordination is difficult without communication but obtains regularly with (mandatory) costless pre …-play messages. In a laboratory experiment, we modify communication by making the sending of messages optional and costly. Even small …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010402605
We experimentally study optional costly communication in Stag-Hunt games. Prior research demonstrates that efficient … coordination is difficult without a communication option but obtains regularly with mandatory costless pre-play messages. We find … that even small communication costs dramatically reduce message use when communication is optional, but efficient …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011492032
We study a seller's optimal mechanism for maximizing revenue when a buyer may present evidence relevant to her value. We show that a condition very close to transparency of buyer segments is necessary and sufficient for the optimal mechanism to be deterministic--hence akin to classic third...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011673357
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communicated might matter. In a controlled field experiment, we study a minimally invasive change in the communication of a well …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011350823
Mechanisms to overcome social dilemmas provide incentives to maximize efficiency. However, often – such as when agents are heterogeneous – there is a trade-off between efficiency and equality. Agents' concerns for equality in such instances can limit the ability of mechanisms to promote...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011401649
We study a seller's optimal mechanism for maximizing revenue when a buyer may present evidence relevant to her value. We show that a condition very close to transparency of buyer segments is necessary and sufficient for the optimal mechanism to be deterministic--hence akin to classic third...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599549