This article conducts a detailed analysis of the concept of economic dependence and exploitative abuse based on how their treatment in competition law and economics and their enforcement in European case law have evolved. Although the theoretical roots of these concepts lie in economic theory,...

The paper analyzes the appointment of the European Commission as a strategic game between members of the European Parliament and the Council. The focal equilibrium results in Commissioners that duplicate the policy preferences of national Council representatives. Different internal decision...

This article aims to provide a detailed analysis of the concept of economic dependence and exploitative abuse through their evolution in competition law and economics and in European case law. First, while the theoretical roots of these concepts may be found in economic theory, we show that the...

The paper analyzes the appointment of the European Commission as a strategic game between members of the European Parliament and the Council. The focal equilibrium results in Commissioners that duplicate policy preferences of national Council representatives. Different internal decision rules...

This article conducts a detailed analysis of the concept of economic dependence and exploitative abuse based on how their treatment in competition law and economics and their enforcement in European case law have evolved. Although the theoretical roots of these concepts lie in economic theory,...