We investigate the cost of capital in a model with an agency conflict between inside managers and outside shareholders. Inside ownership reflects the classic tradeoff between incentives and risk diversification, and the severity of agency costs depends on a parameter representing investor...

The authors combine the agency theory of the firm with risk diversification incentives for insiders. Principal-agent problems between insiders and outsiders force insiders to retain a larger share in their firm than they would under a perfect risk diversification strategy. The authors predict...

We investigate the cost of capital in a model with an agency conflict between inside managers and outside shareholders. Inside ownership reflects the classic tradeoff between incentives and risk diversification, and the severity of agency costs depends on a parameter representing investor...

Pensions and contemporary socioeconomic change / Assar Lindbeck -- Different approaches to pension reform from an economic point of view / Jonathan Gruber, David A. Wise -- Labor mobility, redistribution, and pension reform in Europe / Alain Jousten, Pierre Pestieau -- France: the difficult path...