We develop a model where institutions form connections through swaps of projects in order to diversify their individual risk. These connections lead to two different network structures. In a clustered network groups of financial institutions hold identical portfolios and default together. In an...

We develop a simple model of the interbank market where banks trade a long term, safe asset. We show that when there is a lack of opportunities for banks to hedge aggregate and idiosyncratic liquidity shocks, the interbank market is characterized by excessive price volatility. In such a...

Bank market power, both in the loan and deposit market, has important implications for credit provision and for financial stability. This article discusses these issues through the lens of a simple theoretical framework. On the asset side, banks choose the quality and quantity of loans. On the...

This paper analyzes the role of liquidity regulation and its interaction with capital requirements. We first introduce costly capital in a bank run model with endogenous bank portfolio choice and run probability, and show that capital regulation is the only way to restore the efficient...

We provide new evidence on how deposit funding affects bank lending. For identification, we exploit a tax reform in Italy that induced households to substitute bank bonds with deposits. We find that banks with larger increases in deposits expand the supply of credit lines and long-term credit to...

We provide new evidence on how deposit funding affects bank lending. For identification, we exploit a tax reform in Italy that induced households to substitute bank bonds with deposits. We find that banks with larger increases in deposits expand the supply of credit lines and long-term credit to...

Bank market power, both in the loan and deposit market, has important implications for credit provision and for financial stability. This article discusses these issues through the lens of a simple theoretical framework. On the asset side, banks choose the quality and quantity of loans. On the...

The financial sector is heavily regulated in order to prevent financial crises. The recent crisis showed how ineffective this regulation and other types of government intervention were in achieving this aim. We argue that the crisis was primarily caused by housing price bubbles. These occurred...

Banks are intrinsically fragile because of their role as liquidity providers. This results in under-provision of liquidity. We analyze the e¤ect of government guarantees on the interconnection between banks' liquidity creation and likelihood of runs in a model of global games, where banks.and...

Loan guarantees represent a form of government intervention to support bank lending. However, their use raises concerns as to their effect on bank risk-taking incentives. In a model of financial fragility that incorporates bank capital and a bank incentive problem, we show that loan guarantees...