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Exploitation aversion : when financial incentives fail to motivate agents
Carpenter, Jeffrey P.; Dolifka, David - 2013
rewards to performance increases effort, but that they can also backfire, reducing effort. Intrinsic motivation, the internal …. If the incentives crowd-out intrinsic motivation, and the effect is large enough, the net motivational effect on effort …, is one facet of intrinsic motivation, triggered by the combination of high-powered incentives and egoistic principal …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009771729
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Exploitation Aversion : When Financial Incentives Fail to Motivate Agents
Carpenter, Jeffrey P. - 2013
rewards to performance increases effort, but that they can also backfire, reducing effort. Intrinsic motivation, the internal …. If the incentives crowd-out intrinsic motivation, and the effect is large enough, the net motivational effect on effort …, is one facet of intrinsic motivation, triggered by the combination of high-powered incentives and egoistic principal …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013078830
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Exploitation aversion : when financial incentives fail to motivate agents
Carpenter, Jeffrey P.; Dolifka, David - In: Journal of economic psychology : research in economic … 61 (2017), pp. 213-224
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011757213
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Team governance : empowerment or hierarchical control
Friebel, Guido; Schnedler, Wendelin - 2007
We investigate a team setting in which workers have different degrees of commitment to the outcome of their work. We show that if there are complementarities in production and if the team manager has some information about team members, interventions that the manager undertakes in order to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003592940
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Team governance : empowerment or hierarchical control
Friebel, Guido; Schnedler, Wendelin - 2007
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003593107
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Team governance : empowerment or hierarchical control
Friebel, Guido (contributor);  … - 2007
, the more likely it is that teams are empowered. -- Team work ; incentives ; informed principal ; intrinsic motivation …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003578893
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Team governance : empowerment or hierarchical control
Friebel, Guido; Schnedler, Wendelin - In: Journal of economic behavior & organization : JEBO 78 (2011) 1/2, pp. 1-13
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009259831
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Motivating agents : how much does the mission matter?
Carpenter, Jeffrey P.; Gong, Erick - 2013
Economic theory predicts that agents will work harder if they believe in the "mission" of the organization. Well-identified estimates of exactly how much harder they will work have been elusive, however, because agents select into jobs. We conduct a real effort experiment with participants who...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010125806
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Team governance : empowerment or hierarchical control
Friebel, Guido (contributor);  … - 2007
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003749826
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Team Governance : Empowerment or Hierarchical Control
Friebel, Guido; Schnedler, Wendelin - 2021
We investigate a team setting in which workers have different degrees of commitment to the outcome of their work. We show that if there are complementarities in production and if the team manager has some information about team members, interventions that the manager undertakes in order to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013316729